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Abstract 
 
An important part of the economic environment for any business is the tax climate.   At the federal 
level, arguments are often made for abandoning the income tax in favor of a national sales tax or 
other type of tax.  At the state level, the United States has a laboratory of sorts for examining the 
economic impact of various types of taxes.  The states exhibit a wide degree of variation in the 
kinds and mix of taxes upon which they rely to raise revenue.  This provides an opportunity for 
comparing economic well-being with the mix of taxes for the various states.  This paper presents 
the results of an empirical study of the relationship between the relative economic well-being of a 
state and its relative portfolio of taxation.  Data on the kinds and relative mix of taxes for the 50 
United States for the years 1993-1999 are summarized.  While the direction of causation is still an 
issue, the results of the study show that statistically significant relationships do exist between a 
state’s tax portfolio and its level and growth of real per capita gross state product.  Hopefully this 
study will add to our understanding of the impact of taxation on the economic climate for 
business.  
 
Introduction 
 
Taxing Questions 
 
hat makes a good tax?  The question is age old and enduring.  It was addressed at some length by Adam 
Smith in The Wealth of Nations.  He began his examination of the subject by setting forth the four 
following maxims: 
 
1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, 
in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy 
under the protection of the state. 
2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary.   
3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the 
contributor to pay it. 
4. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little 
as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. (Book IV, chapter II, part II)  
 
Smith‟s maxims contain both the notions of fairness and efficiency.  Equity and economic efficiency 
continue to be standards by which we today judge the „goodness” of a tax.   
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the author via email. 
W 
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This article presents the findings of an empirical study of the comparative tax regimes of the 50 United 
States and the possible impact on economic well-being of the states.  The issue of equity is important but lies outside 
the scope of this investigation.  This study focuses on the relative mix of taxation at the state and local level for the 
50 states to see if there is reason to believe that states are economically any better or worse off by virtue of the 
strategy of taxation that has been adopted by the state.   
 
In 1999, per capita real gross state product ranged from a low of $21,617 in West Virginia to a high of 
$44,263 for Connecticut.  The average for all 50 states was $31,356.  The annual growth in per capita real GSP also 
varied considerably in 1999 with the state of Idaho leading growth at a rate of 7.4% and Delaware experiencing the 
lowest growth declining .7%.  The average growth of per capita real GSP in 1999 was 3.4% for all 50 states.  The 50 
states exhibit a remarkable range of variation in the degree to which they rely on various taxes to raise revenue.  It is 
both an interesting and important exercise to see if a statistically significant relationship can be detected between the 
mix of taxes and economic well-being.  
 
The Issue 
 
The states rely principally on three types of tax to raise revenue.  They use property taxes, consumption 
taxes and income taxes.  Property taxes can include both real and personal property.  Consumption taxes can be 
levied specifically on excised goods like cigarettes, liquor and motor fuels, or they can levied more broadly on retail 
sales.  They can also target purchases of consumables used in a trade or business, in which case they are called use 
taxes.  Income taxes can be levied on income attributed to individuals, to groups of individuals in partnerships, or on 
corporate income.  While these represent the main forms of taxation, states also employ, to a much lesser extent, 
other taxes such as franchise/wealth taxes and licenses/permits.   
 
All of these taxes introduce an element of market distortion and potential inefficiencies that impact 
economic welfare.  Taxing individual income has both an income effect and a substitution effect that combine to 
influence the work-leisure tradeoff.  Taxing an individual‟s income lowers the return and incentive to work.  People 
are therefore less inclined to act in income producing ways and will substitute leisure for work.  But this tax also has 
an obvious income effect that influences the value of additional work at the margin as well as consumption choices 
in the product markets. 
 
Taxing corporate income reduces the return on corporate capital thereby creating an incentive for capital to 
flow to the non-corporate sector.  Optimal capital allocation would require equal after-tax returns on capital in all 
sectors lest investors be tempted to shift capital from one sector in response to higher returns elsewhere.  That being 
so, a tax on corporate income would lead to some corporate investment opportunities being ditched in favor of 
investment opportunities in other sectors that may have lower pretax but higher after-tax returns than the corporate 
sector.   
 
Excise taxes and general sales or use taxes introduce price distortions in the product markets that will create 
at least some measure of deadweight loss to society in all cases where the demand or supply exhibit some degree of 
elasticity.  Buyers facing a new price regime that incorporates their incidence of taxation will respond by demanding 
less quantities of taxed goods.  Producers absorb into their cost structure a portion of the tax that is consistent with 
their incidence of taxation.  They end up willing to produce less quantities at any given market price.  The market 
clears at lower quantities creating the vacuum of unfulfilled producer and consumer surplus known as dead-weight 
loss. 
 
Taxing real property is a bit different in that land is fixed.  A land tax primarily reduces the after tax return 
to the landholder and does not necessarily reduce output.  It would, however, impact the economic value of the land 
creating a market distortion of its own sort. 
 
Taxes are not going to go away and neither will the inefficiencies that come with them.  But we can ask the 
question, “Given the experience of the 50 states, can we detect a discernable difference in either the economic level 
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or rate of growth in output of the various states that bears some relationship to the portfolio of taxes on which the 
states have relied?”. 
 
Related Literature  
 
The impact of taxes at the state level has received much attention from economists over the years.  For a 
thorough summary of the relevant literature, interested readers are advised to consult the book, State Sales and 
Income Taxes-An Economic Analysis (Texas A&M Press, 1999) by George R. Zodrow.  Chapter 3 provides a very 
comprehensive (if not exhaustive) survey of relevant empirical work.  In this chapter, Zodrow references and 
summarizes conclusions from a host of empirical studies that address the following issues: 
 
 Tax exportability through deductibility 
 Tax exportability through price changes 
 Taxes and business location and investment decisions 
 Taxes and start-ups, branch openings 
 Taxes and aggregate investment 
 Taxes and employment, output, income 
 Distortions of capital supply and allocation 
 Distortions on the capital-labor mix 
 Distortions of risk-taking 
 Distortions of the choice of organizational form 
 Distortions of the financing decision 
 Distortions of the payout decision 
 Distortions of consumer purchasing decisions 
 Distortions of savings decisions 
 Distortions of the labor-leisure choice 
 Distortions of human capital accumulation decisions 
 Equity issues 
 
Zodrow also provides an extensive bibliography with over 200 entries noting important books and articles 
on the subject.  More recent studies have been included in the references at the end of this article. 
 
The results of previous studies are mixed.  The fact that people keep coming back to examine various 
aspects of state and local taxation attests to the inconclusive state of the empirical research to date.  Economic theory 
generally says that taxes matter.  Previous research would not categorically refute that statement but it does not 
always support it.  The results to date are sufficient to motivate researchers to keep looking for further evidence to 
increase our understanding of the impact of taxes. 
 
Methodology 
 
If the mix of taxes matters, then it is reasonable to expect to find some statistically significant relationship 
between the economic output of the states and the structure of the states‟ tax regimes.  Tax regimes in this study are 
defined by the relative shares of an individual state‟s total taxes represented by property tax, general sales tax 
(including use tax), specific sales tax, individual income tax, corporate income tax and other tax.  The absolute 
dollar amounts of taxes in each category are reported by the Bureau of the Census and are summarized for all of the 
states.  A tax index was constructed for each tax on a state-by-state basis.  The numerator of the index was a given 
state‟s particular tax share of that state‟s total tax revenue.  The denominator was the average tax share for all 50 
states for that specific type of tax.  For example, in 1998 Nevada drew 62.3% of its total tax revenue from property 
taxes.  Oregon by contrast only saw 10.3% of its total taxes that year coming from property.  The average for all 50 
states in 1998 was 36.2% of total tax revenue being derived from property.  Thus the index for Nevada would be 
1.721 (62.3/36.2) and .285 (10.3/36.2) for Oregon.  In similar fashion, an index was constructed for each tax, for 
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each state, for the years 1993 through 1999.  Table 1 presents each state‟s average tax shares over this period of time 
as well as the 50 states average for each type of tax.  
 
 
TABLE 1: 1993-1999 Average Tax Shares 
 
1993-1999 
Average State & 
Local Tax Shares Property tax 
Sales and 
gross receipts 
tax 
General sales 
tax 
Selective 
sales tax 
Individual 
income tax   
Corporate 
income tax  
Motor vehicle 
license & 
other taxes 
Alabama 0.127584 0.510736 0.311042 0.199694 0.219106 0.029514 0.113059 
Alaska 0.307703 0.108767 0.047936 0.060831 0.000000 0.159697 0.423833 
Arizona 0.299950 0.448599 0.346745 0.101855 0.160548 0.042942 0.047962 
Arkansas 0.167900 0.486563 0.348974 0.137589 0.240150 0.043120 0.062267 
California 0.263295 0.354975 0.267933 0.087042 0.251399 0.062223 0.068108 
Colorado 0.305922 0.368976 0.278840 0.090136 0.249593 0.021676 0.053833 
Connecticut 0.367580 0.311581 0.200806 0.110775 0.216042 0.049520 0.055278 
Delaware 0.146969 0.118606 0.000000 0.118606 0.325457 0.085523 0.323446 
Florida 0.353266 0.518139 0.348596 0.169543 0.000000 0.031039 0.097556 
Georgia 0.275255 0.391273 0.305780 0.085493 0.252944 0.038061 0.042467 
Hawaii 0.161411 0.514836 0.369828 0.145008 0.262783 0.015750 0.045219 
Idaho 0.262689 0.342864 0.236009 0.106855 0.261850 0.044844 0.087754 
Illinois 0.381009 0.334730 0.189485 0.145244 0.181414 0.048997 0.053850 
Indiana 0.334355 0.290936 0.211593 0.079343 0.281700 0.064358 0.028651 
Iowa 0.337688 0.318158 0.219628 0.098531 0.237282 0.028854 0.078018 
Kansas 0.308652 0.370507 0.271909 0.098598 0.215400 0.040901 0.064540 
Kentucky 0.167308 0.374540 0.211531 0.163009 0.310069 0.035691 0.112392 
Louisiana 0.159953 0.542400 0.399575 0.142825 0.140364 0.034279 0.123004 
Maine 0.405380 0.294865 0.207955 0.086910 0.221322 0.027248 0.051185 
Maryland 0.266766 0.261902 0.138296 0.123606 0.378751 0.023632 0.068949 
Massachusetts 0.336584 0.210219 0.118619 0.072103 0.348020 0.061652 0.043524 
Michigan 0.325109 0.300010 0.230160 0.069850 0.236460 0.085583 0.052839 
Minnesota 0.288625 0.310836 0.199701 0.111135 0.285624 0.045437 0.069478 
Mississippi 0.235798 0.509449 0.357708 0.151742 0.147908 0.040712 0.066132 
Missouri 0.233552 0.411078 0.291898 0.119180 0.256612 0.027805 0.070953 
Montana 0.431235 0.142258 0.000000 0.142258 0.217767 0.043577 0.165163 
Nebraska 0.361256 0.337529 0.231634 0.105895 0.205120 0.030461 0.065634 
Nevada 0.219717 0.638713 0.368988 0.269724 0.000000 0.000000 0.141571 
New Hampshire 0.647501 0.190529 0.000000 0.190529 0.017665 0.068546 0.075759 
New Jersey 0.463319 0.266660 0.156434 0.110226 0.181636 0.041556 0.046828 
New Mexico 0.123853 0.528810 0.406040 0.122770 0.169173 0.037781 0.140383 
New York 0.318566 0.265594 0.181086 0.084508 0.295534 0.074594 0.045712 
North Carolina 0.214919 0.365430 0.230003 0.135427 0.303203 0.052517 0.063931 
North Dakota 0.291749 0.408782 0.219897 0.188885 0.105407 0.050783 0.143279 
Ohio 0.287766 0.312901 0.211597 0.101304 0.309523 0.026515 0.063295 
Oklahoma 0.159180 0.413474 0.297169 0.116306 0.236445 0.026828 0.164073 
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Oregon 0.333653 0.098106 0.000002 0.098104 0.395629 0.039035 0.133577 
Pennsylvania 0.281805 0.297275 0.189111 0.108164 0.242378 0.050779 0.127763 
Rhode Island 0.414878 0.294908 0.170981 0.123927 0.218795 0.028313 0.043106 
South Carolina 0.279338 0.365502 0.263915 0.101587 0.243053 0.030772 0.081336 
South Dakota 0.384357 0.484900 0.349249 0.135650 0.000054 0.026668 0.104021 
Tennessee 0.224610 0.613126 0.457177 0.155949 0.012001 0.048824 0.101439 
Texas 0.377048 0.502358 0.322793 0.179564 0.000008 0.000000 0.120587 
Utah 0.239637 0.418438 0.323792 0.094647 0.260078 0.035356 0.046491 
Vermont 0.436459 0.264684 0.117687 0.146997 0.199344 0.027688 0.071825 
Virginia 0.307670 0.302633 0.162509 0.140124 0.283417 0.023879 0.082401 
Washington 0.307890 0.600525 0.468629 0.131896 0.000000 0.000000 0.091585 
West Virginia 0.193856 0.415227 0.217798 0.197429 0.205438 0.059979 0.125501 
Wisconsin 0.346690 0.282008 0.190126 0.091881 0.281300 0.040765 0.049238 
Wyoming 0.382085 0.338972 0.277671 0.061301 0.000000 0.000000 0.278943 
Average 0.296987 0.363098 0.238497 0.124211 0.201275 0.041085 0.097555 
 
 
Economic output was calculated on a per capita basis using Gross State Product (as reported by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis) divided by Census Bureau state population data.  The 50 states average per capita GSP was 
calculated and then used to develop an index of relative economic output.  In 1999, California had a real per capita 
gross state product of $35,771 while the average for all states that year was $31,356.  This yields an index of per 
capita GSP of 1.141 for California in 1999.   
 
Economic growth was measured by dividing the real per capita gross state product in one year by the real 
per capita gross state product from the previous year.   Calculated in this manner, a 5% growth for a given state 
would result in a number of 1.05.  These results were then used to produce a ratio of average growth for all 50 states.  
A relative growth index was calculated using the state specific growth ratios in the numerator and the state average 
growth ratio in the denominator.  In 1999, California had growth ratio of 1.0661 reflecting 6.61% growth in real per 
capita gross state product.  The average growth ratio for all 50 states that year was 1.034.  Thus, California‟s 1999 
relative growth index would be 1.031 (1.0661/1.034). 
 
Ordinary least squares was used to test the relationship between economic well-being and tax structure.  
The dependent variables were indexes of levels and growth in per capita GSP as discussed above.  The independent 
variables were indexes of relative tax shares, also previously discussed.  Data for the years 1993 through 1999 were 
used and tested both on a year-by-year cross-sectional basis and also on a cross-sectional pooled basis for the 
cumulative 1993 to 1999 year period.  The categories of taxes examined were property taxes, consumption taxes, 
income taxes and other taxes.  The consumption taxes were most broadly categorized as gross receipts taxes and 
then more narrowly as general sales and selective sales taxes.  Income taxes were categorized on the individual and 
corporate levels.  The remaining taxes were grouped and categorized as other taxes. 
 
The general format of the regression equations would be: 
 
Index of relative annual per capita growth in real GSP =  +  (tax share index)  
 
Index of relative per capita real GSP =  +  (tax share index) 
 
The results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Summary and discussion of results 
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In general, the results for the cross-sectional pooled data were more statistically robust than the year-by-
year cross sectional data alone.  This is attributable to the fact that there would be collectively 350 data points for the 
seven year period rather than just the 50 individual state data points for a given year.  The resulting R-squares are 
generally low but this would be logical given the complex nature economic output and growth and all the factors 
that could go into explaining it.  Tax structure, if it had an impact at all, would not be expected to play a dominant 
explanatory role in understanding the relative per capita levels or growth rates of gross state product for the 50 
individual states.   
 
Property Taxes 
 
If a state has a greater than average share of its total tax revenues attributable to property taxes, then that 
state is likely to experience above average levels and growth of per capita real gross state product.  R-squares for the 
1993-99 period are .026 for levels of GSP and .054 for growth in GSP for that same period.  The respective 
estimated coefficients for the property tax index are positive and significant at greater than a 99.9% confidence 
level. The degree of explanatory power, while statistically significant, is not impressive with respect to the relative 
levels of per capita GSP.  Only 2.6% of the variation in the index of relative per capita level of GSP can be 
explained by the property tax index.  The results from testing the 7 years individually yield results that are similar in 
terms of magnitude and sign but lack the same degree of statistical robustness.  
 
The index of relative property tax shares does a bit better explaining 5.4% of the variation in the index of 
relative growth in per capita GSP.  The data tested on a year-by-year basis produced similar results with statistical 
significance at a greater than 90% confidence level for the estimated tax variable coefficient in 4 of the 7 years. 
 
A plausible economic argument can be made for these results.  To the extent that the supply of taxable 
property is relatively fixed in the short-run, then taxing property should not create any dead-weight loss to the 
economy.  In exhibit 1, D0 and DT represent the effective demand for property on a before and after tax basis 
respectively with the vertical distance between the demand curves reflecting the absolute value of the tax. 
 
 
EXHIBIT 1 
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Because supply is fixed, the incidence of tax falls completely on the supplier of property with no change in 
either the market clearing price or quantity.  Should there be any elasticity in the supply curve at all, it would have 
an impact on both the market clearing price, the after tax price to the supplier and quantity supplied thereby creating 
some deadweight loss to society.  Price distortions aside, property taxes could be considered advantageous over 
sales taxes on items that have a normal supply curve due to the deadweight losses associated with the latter.   
 
To the extent that a tax at the state level is deductible against federal taxable income, states have the ability 
to export some of the economic burden of a given state tax to the federal level.  For example, if a taxpayer is in a 
30% federal tax bracket and pays a $2000 state tax on property, the after tax effect of the property tax is $1400.  The 
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$2000 property tax was offset by the $600 value of the property tax deduction on the federal tax return.  Because 
property taxes are in this sense “exportable”, it would be consistent to find that states that place greater than average 
reliance on property taxes would have a higher economic well-being. 
 
Gross Receipts Taxes 
 
If a state has a greater than average share of its total tax revenues attributable to gross receipts taxes, then 
that state is likely to experience below average levels of per capita gross state product.  The evidence for a 
relationship between relative tax share and per capita growth in real GSP in not as compelling.  For the 1993-99 time 
period, the r-square for estimating the relationship between the index of per capita level of GSP and gross receipts 
tax index was .118.  The tax index coefficient was negative and had a t-statistic of –6.82 indicating statistical 
significance at a greater than 99.9% confidence level.  The 1993-99 relationship between per capita growth index 
and gross receipts tax index also resulted in negative tax index coefficient with a t-statistic of –2.38 indicating 
significance at a 98% confidence level.  The associated r-square however, was only .017 indicating very little 
explanatory power.  Examination of the data on a year-by-year cross sectional basis reinforced the conclusion of a 
significant relationship between an index of per capita level of GSP and a gross receipts tax index.   The resultant r-
squares ranged from .10 to .12 and the coefficients were significant at a 98% confidence level or higher for all 7 
years.  In terms of explaining growth of per capita GSP, only 1 of the 7 periods (1995) resulted in a statistically 
significant coefficient for the gross receipts tax index, and that only at a 90% confidence level.  To the extent that 
there is some degree of causality between economic well-being and tax structure, it is being picked up in the level of 
per capita output but not in this formulation of growth.   
 
Elementary analysis of tax that is routinely presented in introductory economics texts provides at least 
some theoretical justification for this result.  In exhibit 2 below, a constant dollar excise tax is represented by the 
vertical distance between the before (S0) and after tax (ST) supply curves.  The introduction of the tax results in a 
lower quantity of output.  Given the demand function, the incidence of tax is shared by consumers and producers.   
The deadweight loss in economic efficiency is the triangular area representing reduced consumer and producer 
surplus due to the introduction of the excise tax.  
 
 
EXHIBIT 2 
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The textbook story is consistent with the empirical results showing a statistically significant relationship 
between above average reliance on sales taxes and below average levels of per capita GSP.   
 
Unlike property taxes, sales taxes are no longer deductible against federal taxable income for individuals.  
States are not in a position to export sales taxes to the federal level.  They absorb the impact largely within their 
constituency.  The empirical results of this study are consistent with this fact. 
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General Sales and Selective Sales Taxes 
 
Gross receipts taxes are composed of general sales and selective (excise) taxes.  As such, the results for 
these subsets closely mirror the results of the more generalized categorization.  States that have above shares of their 
total tax revenues coming from general or selective sales taxes are likely to be experiencing below average levels of 
per capita gross state product.  R-squares for the equations explaining 1993-99 levels of per capita levels of GSP 
using general sales and selective sales tax indexes were .087 and .070, respectively.  The coefficients were negative 
and significant at confidence levels exceeding 99.9%.  The results were affirmed when tested on a year-by-year 
cross sectional basis.   
 
With respect to the 1993-99 indexes of growth in per capita GSP, the resultant coefficient of the general 
sales tax index variable was negative and significant at a 96% confidence level but the explanatory power as 
measured by r-square was only .013.   On a year-by-year basis, the same coefficient was statistically significant in 
only 1 of 7 years.    The selective sales tax index coefficient had virtually no statistically significant power to explain 
the per capita growth index for either the pooled 1993-99 data or the individual years.   
 
Individual Income Tax 
 
A weak but statistically significant positive relationship between the index of annual growth in per capita 
gross state product and the index for individual income tax share was evidenced in the 1993-99 pooled data.  The 
resultant r-square was only .022 but the coefficient for the tax variable was positive and significant at a 99% 
confidence level.  It is hard to place too much confidence in this result because when testing on a year-by-year basis, 
statistical significance at a confidence level of 90% or greater for the tax index coefficient was achieved for only 1 
of the 7 years.  Furthermore, there was no statistically significant relationship between the index of per capita level 
of GSP and the individual income tax index.  This was true using the pooled data or the individual years.   
 
Taxing income theoretically reduces incentives to work thereby, influencing the work leisure tradeoff in the 
direction of more leisure and less work.  But to the extent that people are committed to maintaining an existing 
standard of living and wealth, then they would have to work more in order to maintain the same after-tax standards.  
These two forces would offset each other.  The empirical results suggest that at the state level, these forces virtually 
cancel each other out and taxing individual income is more neutral than taxing either property or gross receipts.   
 
Individual income taxes are deductible against federal income and are therefore exportable to the federal 
level.  Individual income taxes appear to be neutral in terms of relative levels and growth of per capita GSP.  If the 
exportable nature of income taxes is having a positive effect on the economic well-being of the states, it would only 
be to the extent that it is helping to offset the disincentives to engage in income producing behavior attributable to 
taxing income. 
 
Corporate Income Tax 
 
States that have a greater than average share of tax revenues attributable to corporate income tax are likely 
to have higher than average levels of per capita GSP.  In terms of r-square, the corporate income tax index explained 
12% of the variation in the index of per capita level of GSP with a positive tax index coefficient significant at a 
greater than 99.99% confidence level.    The results were supported in all 7 of the years tested individually.  The 
results for the regressions testing the relationship between tax structure and growth did not demonstrate any 
statistical significance.  This was somewhat surprising given the rather robust results of the regressions testing the 
index of per capita levels of GSP against the index of corporate income tax.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the primary disadvantage to taxing corporate income is that it encourages 
capital to move from the corporate sector  (which would now be suffering from lower after tax returns) and flow into 
non corporate sectors which offer lower gross but higher  after-tax net returns.   The practical realities are such that 
returns to capital are taxed in all sectors.  Corporate income tax rates at the state level are much lower than at the 
federal level.  Therefore it is hard to imagine that state level corporate income taxes, as currently structured, would 
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have any significant influence on capital flows.  Even the fact that states approach taxing corporate income very 
differently should not be expected to have a great amount of influence on corporate behavior in terms of where a 
corporate business decides to locate itself.  This is because corporations by statute generally must apportion their 
income and pay tax to the various states where they have an economic presence.  The apportionment formulas are 
based upon sales, payroll and property in the various states with the sales factor being double weighted.  So a 
corporation physically located primarily in a low or no income tax state might well still find itself paying hefty 
income tax bills to any other state where it has established an economic presence. 
 
State income taxes paid by corporations are deductible against federal taxable income, therefore states have 
the ability to “export” these taxes to the federal level.  But due to the nature of corporate income taxation at the state 
level, any given state is also able to take advantage of the income producing activities of out-of-state corporations 
that nevertheless have established an economic presence within that state.  The presence may be as little as having 
one part-time employee in the state or storing limited amounts of inventory within a state or having a service 
representative enter the state once in a given year to service a product sold to a customer in that state.  Any of these 
conditions would be sufficient to establish a taxable nexus within a state with respect to income tax.  Once 
established, the out-of-state corporate income would be apportioned to that state using an apportionment formula 
based on double weighted sales, property and payroll for a given state divided by that corporation‟s total sales, 
property and payroll in all states.   As such, sales into a given state by out-of-state corporations have a very 
significant impact on the state‟s corporate tax revenue.   The empirical result here is most likely picking up the fact 
that states with relatively higher per capital levels of income make relatively more purchases in general.  Out-of-
state corporations will in turn sell relatively more to customers in these wealthier states and thereby apportion more 
income and pay more tax to those same states.  
 
Other Taxes 
 
Taxes other than taxes on property, consumption and income fall into the “other taxes” category.  The 
percentage of a state‟s total tax revenue falling into this category averages 7.4% for all 50 state but varies widely 
from state to state with a high of 40% for Alaska and a low of 1.8% for Indiana.  Examples of these taxes would be 
franchise taxes on business capital, permits and fees, airport or port authority taxes and such.  It is an eclectic 
categorization and produced results consistent with its eclectic nature.  To the extent that states have a greater than 
average share of tax revenues falling into this category, they are likely to be experiencing above average levels of 
per capita GSP but below average rates of growth.  The equation for regressing the 1993-99 indexes of per capita 
levels of GSP against the other tax indexes resulted in an r-square of .158 and a positive coefficient for the tax index 
coefficient significant at a greater than 99.99% confidence level.  The equation for regressing the 1993-99 indexes of 
annual growth in per capita GSP resulted in a lower r-square of  .087 and a negative coefficient for the tax index that 
was significant at a greater than 99.99% level of confidence.  Both results were supported when examining the 
individual years.  The result is perplexing because on one hand, above average reliance on other taxes suggests 
above average levels of per capita GSP.  On the other hand, it also suggest that these states will be experiencing 
lower rates of growth.  
 
Theoretical analysis of this category of tax is difficult because of eclectic nature of the category.  The 
difference in the signs of the estimated coefficient for the tax variable, positive for per capita levels of GSP but 
negative for growth in per capita GSP, is consistent with the mixed nature of the category.  This is unfortunate 
because the category as a whole has a greater average tax share than corporate income taxes.  The average share of 
total tax revenue for other taxes is 9.8% and only 4.2% for corporate income tax.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Does the relative mix of taxes that a state imposes have any discernable impact on that state‟s relative 
economic well being?  Based upon the empirical results of this study, an appropriate response could be a 
resounding, “Maybe!”.  Table 4 below summarizes the relationships examined in this study:  
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TABLE 4 Summary of Relationships Between Relative Tax Structure And Relative Economic Well-being 
 
 
Tax Share Relative 
to 50 State Average Level of Per Capita GSP 
Growth Rate of Per 
Capita GSP 
Property Tax Above Average Above Average Above Average 
Gross Receipts Tax Above Average Below Average Below Average 
General Sales Tax Above Average Below Average Below Average 
Selective Sales Tax Above Average Below Average Not Statistically Significant 
Individual Income Tax Above Average Not Statistically Significant Not Statistically Significant 
Corporate Income Tax Above Average Above Average Not Statistically Significant 
Other Taxes Above Average Above Average Above Average 
 
 
There are many limitations to this study and certainly a significant one would have to be the issue of 
causation.  A state with a higher than average share of tax revenue coming from property taxes is likely to have a 
higher than average level and growth rate of per capita GSP.  But is the tax mix responsible for the above average 
level and growth of the states‟ per capita GSP or is it the above average level and growth of GSP that is generating 
the above average share of taxes from property?  Similar questions could be raised with respect to consumption, 
corporate income and other tax categories.  This problem of causation makes it difficult to draw conclusions that are 
much stronger than “maybe”.  
 
Is there a statistically discernable relationship between the relative mix of taxes that a state adopts and the 
state‟s relative economic well being? The answers here are more definitive and summarized in the above table.  It is 
interesting to note that the taxes that are more “exportable” to the federal level, i.e., property tax and corporate 
income tax, have a positive relationship between relative tax share and economic well-being.  Consumption taxes 
are not as exportable to the federal level and have a negative relationship to a state‟s relative economic well-being. 
 
Suggestions For Future Research 
 
The formulation for economic well-being in this study is admittedly naïve.  It assumes that the impact of 
the relative tax structure on level and growth of per capita GSP is immediate and concurrent within the same year.  
A greater understanding of the probable lags would be helpful.  Discerning causation, as has been noted, is a 
problem.  Statistical methods such as Granger causation tests might prove useful in enhancing our understanding of 
this issue.  The data used in this study reflects the relatively recent economic experience of the United States during 
the decade of the 90‟s.  This was in general a period of sustained economic expansion.  It would be interesting to see 
whether these results would be replicated during periods of time that included economic downturns.  The variations 
in tax structure for the 50 states provided the fodder for testing the relationships between tax structure and economic 
well-being.  A similar methodology could be used with country data that would also reflect various mixes of 
taxation.    
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TABLE 2: Regression Results for Relationship Between Index of Relative Level of Per Capita GSP and Tax Share Index 
 
Index of Relative Level of Per 
Capita Real GSP Related to Tax 
Share Index 
Property 
Tax Index 
Gross 
Receipts 
Tax Index 
General 
Sales Tax 
Index 
Selective 
Sales Tax 
Index 
Individual 
Income Tax 
Index 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Index 
Other Tax 
Index 
1993-99 Pooled Data        
R Square 0.025902 0.117959 0.08732 0.069629 0.004978 0.120815 0.158563 
F Stat 9.253728 46.53931 33.29473 26.046 1.74117 47.8211 65.5783 
Significance of F Stat 0.002529 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.187857 0.000001 0.000001 
Constant 0.918599 1.165997 1.105765 1.133886 1.02222 0.911573 0.929407 
t Stat for Constant 32.5606 45.236 54.56256 41.0081 53.4894 59.3895 77.18925 
P-value for Constant 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Coefficient for Tax Index Variable 0.081361 -0.166 -0.10577 -0.13389 -0.02222 0.088427 0.070592 
t Stat for Tax Index Variable 3.041994 -6.82197 -5.77016 -5.10339 -1.31953 6.915284 8.09805 
P-value for Tax Index Variable 0.002529 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.187857 0.000001 0.000001 
1999        
R Square 0.064175 0.119491 0.079949 0.084518 0.00009 0.069905 0.07511 
F Stat 3.291621 6.51394 4.170998 4.431401 0.004485 3.607649 3.898091 
Significance of F Stat 0.075887 0.013941 0.046636 0.040543 0.946884 0.063533 0.05411 
Constant 0.872575 1.166899 1.101513 1.147451 1.002998 0.926386 0.942424 
t Stat for Constant 11.802 16.88112 20.12731 15.57422 19.76946 20.54924 25.39091 
P-value for Constant 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Coefficient for Tax Index Variable 0.126985 -0.1669 -0.10513 -0.14745 -0.003 0.073614 0.057576 
t Stat for Tax Index Variable 1.814283 -2.55224 -2.0423 -2.10509 -0.06697 1.899381 1.974358 
P-value for Tax Index Variable 0.075887 0.013941 0.046636 0.040543 0.946884 0.063533 0.05411 
1998        
R Square 0.064242 0.12758 0.113468 0.067762 0.00156 0.086384 0.096578 
F Stat 3.295339 7.019392 6.143558 3.488999 0.075006 4.538475 5.131314 
Significance of F Stat 0.075727 0.010884 0.016756 0.067889 0.785358 0.038293 0.028049 
Constant 0.875912 1.167649 1.112442 1.134049 1.012066 0.919516 0.942588 
t Stat for Constant 12.15478 17.42694 22.02499 15.06214 20.25612 20.90105 27.85748 
P-value for Constant 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Coefficient for Tax Index Variable 0.124088 -0.16765 -0.11244 -0.13405 -0.01207 0.080484 0.057412 
t Stat for Tax Index Variable 1.815307 -2.64941 -2.47862 -1.86789 -0.27387 2.13037 2.26524 
P-value for Tax Index Variable 0.075727 0.010884 0.016756 0.067889 0.785358 0.038293 0.028049 
1997        
R Square 0.028682 0.117029 0.08586 0.070745 0.002212 0.083198 0.137722 
F Stat 1.41737 6.361918 4.508384 3.654252 0.106392 4.355927 7.666511 
Significance of F Stat 0.239691 0.01503 0.038911 0.000001 0.745708 0.042214 0.007972 
Constant 0.917418 1.161214 1.102839 1.138531 1.014497 0.91563 .9.84049 
t Stat for Constant 12.5272 17.14599 20.60397 14.97629 20.12175 19.72491 29.90651 
P-value for Constant 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Coefficient for Tax Index Variable 0.082582 -0.16121 -0.10284 -0.13853 -0.0145 0.08437 0.061595 
t Stat for Tax Index Variable 1.190533 -2.52228 -2.1233 -1.91161 -0.32618 2.087086 2.768846 
P-value for Tax Index Variable 0.239692 0.01503 0.038911 0.061906 0.745708 0.042214 0.007972 
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TABLE 3: Regression Results for Relationship Between Index of Relative Growth in GSP and Tax Share Index 
 
Index of Relative Growth in Per 
Capita Real GSP Growth As Related 
to Tax Share Index 
Property 
Tax Index 
Gross 
Receipts 
Tax Index 
General 
Sales Tax 
Index 
Selective 
Sales Tax 
Index 
Individual 
Income Tax 
Index 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Index 
Other Tax 
Index 
1993-99 Pooled Data        
R Square 0.053702 0.016077 0.0132 0.007702 0.0216 0.006255 0.087113 
F Stat 19.74874 5.68637 4.6549 2.70123 7.6828 2.19033 33.20836 
Significance of F Stat 0.000001 0.017632 0.031648 0.101174 0.005874 0.139783 0.000001 
Constant 0.987591 1.006488 1.04354 1.004714 0.995099 1.00213 1.00554 
t Stat for Constant 335.4717 349.2081 450.1294 32.3381 495.9879 580.05 757.3153 
P-value for Constant 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Coefficient for Tax Index Variable 0.012403 -0.00649 -0.00435 -0.00471 0.004901 -0.00213 -0.00554 
t Stat for Tax Index Variable 4.443955 -2.38461 -2.15752 -1.64354 2.771794 -1.47998 -5.76267 
P-value for Tax Index Variable 0.00001 0.017632 0.031649 0.101174 0.005875 0.139784 0.000001 
1999        
R Square 0.063587 0.022856 0.001669 0.129821 0.025449 0.0095 0.178094 
F Stat 3.259436 1.122735 0.080265 7.161039 1.25347 0.460359 10.40087 
Significance of F Stat 0.077287 0.294633 0.778157 0.010162 0.268462 0.500715 0.002269 
Constant 0.987884 1.006972 1.001401 1.07456 0.995273 1.002592 1.008468 
t Stat for Constant 139.8379 144.769 183.8975 148.2896 208.0258 225.6146 301.7384 
P-value for Constant 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Coefficient for Tax Index Variable 0.012074 -0.00697 -0.0014 -0.01746 0.004726 -0.00259 -0.00847 
t Stat for Tax Index Variable 1.805391 -1.05959 -0.28331 -2.67601 1.119585 -0.6785 -3.22504 
P-value for Tax Index Variable 0.077287 0.294633 0.778157 0.010162 0.268462 0.500715 0.002269 
1998        
R Square 0.086008 0.00389 0.007401 0.000521 0.00385 0.013118 0.13245 
F Stat 4.51687 0.187469 0.357918 0.025044 0.185506 0.638036 7.328239 
Significance of F Stat 0.038736 0.666971 0.552477 0.87492 0.668611 0.428358 0.009374 
Constant 0.987411 1.003242 1.00318 1.001302 0.997902 1.003473 1.007444 
t Stat for Constant 124.8077 126.5689 169.5434 116.0112 180.6081 198.2288 274.4369 
P-value for Constant 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Coefficient for Tax Index Variable 0.015896 -0.00324 -0.00318 -0.0013 0.002098 -0.00347 -0.00744 
t Stat for Tax Index Variable 2.125293 -0.43298 -0.59826 -0.15825 0.430704 -0.79877 -2.70707 
P-value for Tax Index Variable 0.038736 0.666971 0.552477 0.87492 0.668611 0.428358 0.009374 
1997        
R Square 0.030224 0.014841 0.006123 0.029314 0.065457 0.013448 0.125252 
F Stat 1.495959 0.723109 0.295725 1.449579 3.361983 0.654288 6.872973 
Significance of F Stat 0.227265 0.399348 0.589092 0.234499 0.072922 0.422575 0.011688 
Constant 0.991264 1.005916 1.00283 1.009189 0.991873 1.003495 1.006053 
t Stat for Constant 131.4593 136.4589 174.3716 126.0463 197.2697 202.2356 308.9217 
P-value for Constant 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Coefficient for Tax Index Variable 0.008736 -0.00592 -0.00283 -0.00919 0.008127 -0.0035 -0.00629 
t Stat for Tax Index Variable 1.223094 -0.85036 -0.54381 -1.20398 1.833571 -0.80888 -2.62164 
P-value for Tax Index Variable 0.227265 0.399348 0.589092 0.234499 0.072922 0.422575 0.011688 
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Notes 
